From Financial Right to Exit Leverage: An Economic Analysis of Mahr in Iranian Family Law

In Iranian family law, mahr is a financial entitlement owed by the husband to the wife under the marriage contract. This paper examines proposals to reform its enforcement within the broader structure of family law. The debate over “fourteen or 110 coins” does not by itself capture the issue: the economic value of mahr depends on a woman’s access to divorce, income and housing, a share in property acquired during marriage, and effective enforcement of judgments.

The analysis treats mahr both as a legal financial right and, in the absence of alternative protections, as a limited source of bargaining leverage when a marriage breaks down. Its central conclusion is that structural reform is necessary, but weakening enforcement without creating substitute protections may shift more of the economic risk of divorce onto women.

The updated paper develops proposals for asset-based enforcement, temporary subsistence support, protective default terms in marriage contracts, and rebuttable presumptions concerning remuneration for domestic and care work. It distinguishes these proposals from existing law and includes 21 footnotes and a bibliography of 24 sources.